process for the benefit of the general public. In context of the times, this is hardly surprising; in the absence of precedent, regulation, or demand, public dissemination of risk information would scarcely be considered. Where the nuclear power industry (along with most others) made a critical mistake was in failing to understand that, twenty years later, certain values and expectations had fundamentally changed. What may have been an asset - a mysterious technology - was, by the 1970s, a liability. Its relationship to topsecret weapons development was misunderstood, becoming a reminder of destructive power and a symbol of paranoia. (Most Americans didn't need reminding, thanks to the fallout shelters and "duck and cover” drills of the 1960s.) Strictly economic arguments could in no way address underlying concern about the risks of nuclear power and suspicion of the industry. Better late than never Not until the Three Mile Island accident raised anxiety about nuclear power safety to the pitch of national hysteria did the industry acknowledge widespread public concerns. And it was not until months afterward that it began to explain process hazards and plant operations in ways the average citizen could understand. (The same could be argued about the chemicals industry, which initiated its Responsible Care program in the aftermath of the Bhopal disaster.) By communicating too little, too late, nuclear energy lost not only a great deal of credibility, but also a unique opportunity to seize the high ground on environmental performance. Myopia is its own reward The failure of the nuclear power industry - and its regulators - to anticipate fixture disposal problems is harder to explain. Nuclear energy was hardly alone in underestimating the sea change in popular sentiment during the early 70s, or in needing a major industrial disaster to provide a wake-up cal Heavy industry across the board has been slow to react to social change, and to respond to public demand for disclosure - with expensive results. Not to foresee and plan for a predictable consequence of its own operations, on the other hand, is a different matter, and the nuclear utilities are paying a very high price. As suggested above, they may have handed their adversaries a silver bullet in the process. The nuclear legacy: inherit the wind The experience of the nuclear power industry in many respects defines the context in which space solar power, or any other alternative energy technology, must establish its credibility. SSP does not have the luxury of unquestioning public trust, nor of large-scale government support, and therefore has a different- - and more difficult - set of challenges in terms of commercialization. Americans' continuing ambivalence towards nuclear power effectively sets a higher standard for emerging technologies, in terms of their comparative safety and environmental performance. It should be pointed out that incumbent technologies share the same legacy, and it is an expensive one. The following statistics from the American Petroleum Institute help to illustrate:
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