stages, including measures to reveai and eliminate organic, individual, and use defects, to prevent and correct errors, determine and observe the conditions of use defects, prevention and correction of errors, and determination and observation of the conditions of use. All the measures are reduced to a simple program to insure reliability (see for example, [12]), which is composed in th initial stage of planning. In subsequent stages this plan may acquire more detail, be refined and supplemented. In the development and implementation of measures, of great importance is the method of analyzing reliability and means of insuring it, which are imposed in the principal scheme and construction. Creation of a docking device should primarily proceed from the fact that the execution of its basic functions depends, as a rule, on the execution of the main task of the flight, and in manned flights, on the safety of the crew. Thus, in the creation, preparation, and use of docking devices, as in other basic spacecraft systems, they act in two directions: do everything possible to insure the maximum fail-safe nature of its basic elements and at the same time, strive to create a structure in which the main functions are carried out if failures arise in individual elements, when errors are committed, or when there are deviations in the conditions of use from the expected. To analyze and evaluate reliability one may use various qualitative and quantitative methods [1, 6]. Widely used probability methods are often ineffective since there are usually no reliable statistical data on individual, frequently unique, elements of construction. These methods are expediently used in the formulation of requirements for the created and tested docking device as one of the spacecraft systems, for comparative evaluation, etc. Tn planning, much more effective is analysis of the structure of the docking device and its individual mechanisms and units, the uncovering of possible (potential) failures with an estimate of the consequences which would arise (criticality of failure). Another classification of docking device failures is possible. The simplest, and possibly the most effective for analysis is the division of failures into three categories of criticality: T. failure related to the safety of the crew; II. failure which leads to failure to complete the main program of the flight or to a condition in which the next failure is a safety failure; ITT. all other failures. For more detailed analysis, one can in principle increase the number of categories.
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