another are included. This approach could shift the technical burden of assessing this information to the energy supplier, and the consumer could be faced with a price he might better understand. CONCLUSION Our “energy crisis” has been more a crisis of policy than a lack of scarce energy or even oil resources, though these resources may not be geologically and politically distributed as we might like. Federal and state governments must continue to rationalize their energy policies to achieve internal consistency and reflect economic reality. Short-term diversion with energy fads and tax wars over the energy “cash cows” will only serve to increase energy costs over the longer term. Rational and predictable energy policies that maximize the workings of the market and minimize government uncertainties will help to insure that high cost energy sources are not forced upon us too soon nor energy alternatives developed too late. It is probably true, though plausible energy scenarios differ widely, that we will need to rely more on coal between now and the next century if government policies permit us to do so and the health hazards posed by coal can be handled. At the same time, we have only begun to see the conservation effect of “real world” energy prices domestically, and there is much potential left for energy conservation if the government will allow market incentives to work. The same is true of solar energy. Only recently has it been made more economically attractive through increased oil prices, and a number of technological breakthroughs have already occurred. If governments foster an open and competitive environment in the electric utility sector, both centralized and decentralized technologies can be cost effectively implemented. It is not immediately clear how far into the future the current soft oil market will last, nor when the next oil price spike will occur. But government energy policies that significantly withdraw capital from oil and gas production and/or establish nonmarket price or volume controls will only serve to perpetuate our “energy crisis” for the future, with all that implies for foregone GNP and higher inflation. Plans for energy consumption and production need time to be implemented. Infrastructure responding to new energy prices must be built, and the process of rationalizing our energy system must continue and grow. To help insure a smooth energy transition to the next century, our energy markets must remain flexible. Our energy policy must be consistent and must foster, rather than hinder, interfuel and intercompany competition. And our public research and development efforts in energy must be aimed at basic research in a broad spectrum of energy conservation and energy resource technology. REFERENCES 1. J.R. Brodman and R. E. Hamilton, A Comparison of Energy Projections to 1985, IEA Monograph, Paris, January 1979. 2. W.A.P. Manser, Oil: A Curious Crisis, The Banker, September 1979, p. 65. 3. H. Brooks and J.M. Hollander, United States Energy Alternatives to 2010 and Beyond: The CONAES Study, Annual Review of Energy, 4, 1-70, Palo Alto, CA, 1979. 4. Roger Sant, The Least-Cost Energy Strategy: Minimizing Consumer Costs Through Competition. The Energy Productivity Center, Mellon Institute. Arlington, VA, 1979. 5. Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School, Random House, New York, 1978. 6. Amory B. Lovins, Soft Energy Technologies, Annual Review of Energy, 3, Palo Alto, CA, 1978.
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