den which government alone would otherwise have to bear in pursuit of the general interest. It is understandable that private enterprise would be unwilling to risk its scarce capital on projects that are twice risky: (1) that the technology or economics may not prove feasible, and (2) that future government action or inaction may result in loss of their investments. For example, concern that future international agreements would result in effective expropriation of their investment has clearly impeded entry of private firms into exploitation of seabed resources. Firms can live with a wide variety of legal and economic structures, but they must have some definite pattern expected to remain in place for a reasonably long time — otherwise planning becomes very difficult if not impossible. The US may “go naked” of international law, using domestic law as an “adequate legal framework” for seabed mining by its own citizens, but this is not likely to be a satisfactory long-term solution (15). THE FOCUS ON ALLOCATION OF BENEFITS The Group of 77 (G-77: identifies a group of Less Developed Nations) now numbers over 100 members. They have taken similar positions on both seabed mining and space development. From the perspective of their own societies (usually collectivist to some degree) and their perceived national interests, their position makes perfect sense. The beautiful simplicity of the market approach — let he who will risk his capital and either reap his reward or fail — finds the G-77 effectively frozen out. They have neither the technology and expertise to do deep sea mining nor the capital to acquire it. It is thus both efficient and rational, in their national self-interest and in accord with the collectivist perspective, to take the position that seabed mining should be allowed only under terms which guarantee that rewards will be shared by all. If the sea's resources can be defined as belonging to no person or no nation, but as a common heritage of mankind, to mine (deplete) this resource becomes a decision to invest collectively-owned resources. If all nations invest, all nations should share benefits flowing from the investment. It is one of the few ways poor nations have of directly acquiring a share of wealth that otherwise might accrue only to the rich (16). The standard reply of market theorists to such collectivist reasoning is that, first, resources should belong to he who develops them, and second, “a rising tide lifts all boats.” As wealth is continually created in ever greater abundance, some of it will “trickle down” from the rich to the poor. Greater net wealth allows all, even the poor, to improve their absolute if not relative standards of living. To the market economist the key requirement is that absolute levels of wealth rise, whether relative inequality remains the same or even worsens. Because relative inequality of wealth is accepted in market societies, its advocates need not stress greater equality of wealth. Collectivists are rarely impressed by “trickle down” arguments. Further, even market societies are no longer entirely comfortable with them. The challenge may be most severe not in the area in which the market claims superiority, allocation of scarce material resources, but in allocating scarce social resources (17). Although it may be possible to find new raw material sources in space or on the planet, or to develop substitutions, some resources of social importance are definitely finite. Beachfront property or unspoiled vistas, for example, are inherently scarce resources for which adequate social substitutes may not exist. Further, in the usual
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTU5NjU0Mg==