cussed and studied long before they are approved and built. Even today, difficulties have been reported in the final phases of the Rhine-Danube linkup which, as we mentioned earlier, was first attempted by Charlemagne. The Panama Canal was first suggested by a cousin of Cortez. Without patience, nothing worthwhile can be accomplished. Afterall, Riquet de Bon Repos, the promoter of the Canal des Deux Mers which still links the Mediterranean and Atlantic Oceans, was not discouraged by the fact that the scheme had been proposed during the reign of Francois 1. There is an evident danger in undertaking detailed assessments too soon, especially when technologies and costs are evolving rapidly, and a working prototype is often a useful device. When Bon Repos requested a concession from Louis XIV, Colbert wisely required a “ruisseau d’essai,” a four-inch-wide model canal along the projected route. Does this not suggest that even for a solar power satellite, we should “learn to walk before we run”? Macro-engineering studies can provide useful guidance for the consideration of future large-scale projects, and it will be wise and prudent to encourage systematic research, on an international scale, if we are to optimize such opportunities as the solar power satellite: The “Macro-Planner” computer model developed by C. Lawrence Meador and Arthur Parthe at M.I.T.’s Macro-Engineering Research Group provides a sensible framework for such analysis. Based on control theory, it envisages a “macro-engineering state space” in which three vectors are outlined: (1) the extent of the call on resources of all kinds (money, materials, manpower, etc.); (2) the degree of impact on the physical and social environment; and (3) the degree of difficulty in management and technology. Such a “checklist” may appear “elementary” to some sophisticated analysts; but it has been common experience that major bloopers have occurred because what hindsight identifies as “obvious” was in fact overlooked or insufficiently measured. Perhaps the United Nations itself, through some appropriate agency such as UNESCO, can serve as a central clearinghouse on past, present and projected projects and programs which are likely to have substantial international impacts. The very processes of diplomacy itself are increasingly concerned with the design and authorization of macro-engineering projects. In no field is this more evident than in the burgeoning investments in outer space. By explicitly providing a “place at the table” for large-scale engineering considerations, the inevitable controversies and polemics spawned by major initiatives can at least be brought down from the realm of fantasy and fear to the more solid ground of fact and realistic assessment. Nor must large-scale endeavor be confused with those dread enemies of mankind: pollution, congestion, and alienation. Would not transcontinental bikeways be a worthy example of the potential of big technology for the furtherance of health and happiness on earth? Let us, by all means, have better tools and instrumentalities for analysis and information: But having brought the macro-engineers to the “green- covered tables” described by Metternich as mankind’s best hope, let us assign them creative tasks. If the Dutch succeeded in building a new nation in the sea-swept lowlands of northern Europe, cannot the combined technology of the planet, judiciously applied, suggest solutions even to thorny international problems which have vexed traditional diplomacy for generations? Herein lies the appeal of such imaginative innovations as the solar power satellite. Experimentation that may be too expensive and hazardous for individual nations could become viable as a joint venture of several communities. Clearly, timing and the correct choice of partners will be important. And there must be a propitious diplomatic and legal framework. But as further developments in technology bring
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