oped country delegations to the U.S. arguments was immediate and hostile. Edward Miles, a member of the U.S. delegation, reports on what happened next: “The EEC paper, presented by France, was very similar to the U.S. paper, but did not elicit the same response. The essential difference was one of style. Much of what the U.S. delegate said was in the form of ideological posturing about the free-enterprise system. There was an excessive amount of ‘noise’ in the communication, perhaps engendered by similar ideological posturing in the Group of 77. . .The point is that the ensuing barrage was aimed as much at the ‘noise’ as at substantive differences in approach, and this was clearly avoidable. The effects also appear to be lasting and, if so, will play a part in determining whether or not there is ultimate agreement.” (20) Since Miles wrote this description, UNCLOS III has moved toward acceptance of the position of the developed countries—primarily as a result of the efforts of EEC members such as France and Netherlands. The delay, however, has been costly, both in terms of U.S. prestige and in terms of delays in the development of deep seabed mining technology. If international acceptance of SPS is to be achieved, a similar contretemps on the issues of development and commercialization of satellite power should be avoided. The prospects for international acceptance of SPS are potentially good, since satellite power represents the harnessing of advanced technology to the solution of a problem that affects all of mankind: the eventual exhaustion of fossil fuels. At the same time, a potential for effective international opposition to SPS remains. The determining factor is the extent to which SPS proponents, including both scien- tific/technical personnel and others with influence over public policy, can present satellite power in a manner that emphasizes its beneficial effects of perceived national interests. . .and particularly the perceived national interests of countries with spacefaring capabilities. Specifically, the United States, which has taken the lead in research and development of SPS, must identify foreign interests that • are favorable to SPS development and commercialization; and • are complementary to U.S. national interests. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this concept of complementary national interests. For example, as stated earlier, all developed countries, including the Soviet Union, apparently share several similar perceptions of national interest in regard to points at issue in the development and exploitation of global resources. These shared perceptions may include a preference for weak international regulatory authorities, the maintenance of national and/or regional control over technology transfer, and defense of the right of the developer of global resources to distribute the benefits of exploitation with little or not mandatory sharing among the Third World. The EEC and CMEA nations appear to share similar perceptions of national interest not held by other developed nations, notably a preference for development and exploitation of energy resources on a regional basis by public enterprises. Finally, the Soviet bloc and the Group of 77 share an ideological interest in depicting private development of global resources in the worst possible light: as selfish exploitation by unsavory capitalists and neocolonialists. Some general principles on the projection of international reaction to SPS are readily derived from these observations. Emphasis on ideological arguments in favor of either the SPS concept or specific aspects of its development and commercialization are likely to be counterproductive. Emphasis on SPS capabilities for decreasing the demand for fossil fuels are likely to be more useful in promoting favorable
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