been achieved, and there is some question as to whether it ever can be achieved. As Werner Levi observed, “Morality is related to behavior and (rational) behavior is end oriented. . .The usual sequence: defining the interest first, choosing the behavior to realize it second, examining both in the light of morality third (assuming that all three processes are deliberate) creates a tendency to give interests primacy over morality. This becomes truer the stronger the interest. And there are no more compelling social interests than those called national interests.” (15) So long as national interests are perceived as primary motivating factors, it can be expected that international legal norms as a form of institutionalized international morality will receive secondary attention in influencing government reactions to technological and resource issues. Indeed, for most political leaders, a willingness to sacrifice national interest to the dictates of international law represents an absence of morality in the eyes of his or her national supporters. Yet international law exists and, to some extent, governs national behavior. This paradox has been addressed by the suggestion of some legal scholars and political scientists that international law is best understood as a reflection of, rather than an influence on, the national interests of the dominant actors in international relations (16). In the 1970’s, the validity of this thesis has been evidenced on numerous occasions. At UNCLOS III, for example, delegates of the USSR warned that the Soviet Union would not view as valid any treaty which it had not ratified, and that it would not ratify any treaty that created a strong international authority governing the deep seabed resources (17). Within the past year, the U.S. Ambassador to UNCLOS III has made similar declarations (18), while the leader of the U.S. delegation to the World Administrative Radio Conference warned that his country might defy decisions by the Conference that ran counter to the U.S. positions (19). In effect, the representatives of the superpowers were claiming effective veto powers to the creation of international legislation that ran counter to their national interests. In all likelihood, the tradition that states with the capability of enforcing international agreements will be the states that determine the effective content of such agreements will dominate the development of international laws governing satellite power systems. Only a limited number of developed countries have such a capability with respect to orbital systems, and most of them have the potential of regarding the development of satellite power to be beneficial to their national interests. If this potential is realized, the resulting international legal agreements will tend to encourage, rather than inhibit, development of SPS. Thus, the most relevant question of international reaction to SPS remains: what will be the perceived national interests regarding SPS of the key actors in the international system? PREPARING FOR THE INEVITABLE DEBATE In August 1974, debate began at UNCLOS III in Caracas on the rules and regulations to be embodied in an international agreement on exploitation of deep seabed mineral resources. The U.S. and other developed countries shared similar positions; because private American firms were rapidly developing the technological capability to exploit such resources, the U.S. was very eager to have the issues resolved and was the first national delegation to present its case. The reaction of the lesser devel-
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