geographic or ideological bloc: e.g., the Group of 77, the Andean group, the Soviet bloc nations, the OECD states, etc. NATIONAL INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTION TO SPS The process of formulating national policy positions, as outlined in Figure 1, does not lend itself to a rational, coherent development of policy determined by a single conception of national interest. Even when nations consciously attempt to follow a course dictated by “national interest,” the resulting positions may appear vague or contradictory. This is because “national interest” itself consists of a set of potentially competing interests. As a general rule, the larger and more complex the state, the more diverse and potentially conflicting are the components of its “national interest.” These observations notwithstanding, there exist a basic set of interests which virtually all nations hold, and which cannot be compromised or traded. These can be defined as the permanent, primary national interests. As suggested by Thomas W. Robinson, they include protection of the nation’s physical, political, and cultural (including ideological) identity, and survival against encroachment from outside forces (11). If satellite power systems were to threaten any of these interests (as suggested earlier), rapid and determined national response would be expected regardless of side benefits of SPS technology that might accrue to the nation. Robinson’s concept of national interests also comprises additional variable and secondary interests that have potential for shaping an individual government’s reaction to the development and implementation of SPS. These vary widely, depending on the country under consideration; Table 2 provides illustrative examples, using hypothetical Soviet perceptions of Soviet national interests (12). As shown in Table 2, the motivation of pursuing national interest is unlikely to result automatically in rejection or acceptance of international cooperation in SPS development and implementation. Determination of a specific government’s reaction to satellite power therefore depends on careful assessment of the component primary, secondary, permanent and variable national interests affected by SPS under alternative development and implementation scenarios. The prediction of alternative national reactions to SPS based on perceived national interests is facilitated by the fact that most nations exhibit relatively consistent patterns in perceiving and expressing their interests. Albania, to cite an extreme example, perceives the maintenance of an autarkial economy as a permanent, primary interest. Consequently, since Albania is not very interested in developing interdependent relationships, its participation in multilateral discussions of resource questions is usually limited to advancing ideological goals: i.e., in using such forums to denounce imperialism, Soviet and Chinese communism, Zionism, and neocolonialism (13). Similarly, the Soviet Union tends to strongly support the right of states to unilaterally exploit resources required for its own economic and military interests; at UNCLOS III, the USSR has consistently been aligned with the other advanced technology states, including the nations of Western Europe (14). However, when the resource of technology at issue is unimportant to Soviet economic and political interests, the USSR tends to support the claims of lesser developed countries against the Western industrialized states as a means of advancing its ideological prestige. Similar observations on predictable definition and pursuit of national inter-
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