SPACE SOLAR POWER REVIEW Volume 2, Number 3, 1981
0191-9067/81/030199-01 $02.00/0 Copyright ® 1981 SUNSAT Energy Council EDITORIAL Space Solar Power Review is expanding its coverage to the area of space industrialization. This is a natural evolution of the scope of this journal from space solar power systems to additional uses of space. Papers are welcome in any area pertaining to the use of space for the benefit of mankind. This includes papers on the technical engineering aspects of space industrialization or utilization as well as the social, environmental, and economic areas. This includes topics such as large space structures, space manufacturing, communications satellites, and terrestrial or extraterrestrial materials resources, etc. Papers may be full length papers, not to exceed 25 typewritten pages or short reports or technical notes, not to exceed 5 pages. Letters to the editor and meeting reports are also welcome. Papers are expected to be of the highest professional quality and all will be refereed by members of the board of associate editors or their colleagues. Manuscripts should be submitted to me with an original and two copies. Space Solar Power Review will continue to be published by Pergamon Press under the auspices of the SUNSAT Energy Council. A subscription is included with the membership fee of that organization. For information write to Fred Osborne, Executive Secretary The SUNSAT Energy Council Box 201 Cold Spring, NY 10516 Phone (914) 265-3579 Subscriptions are also available directly from Pergamon Press, Inc., Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523. John W. Freeman Editor-in-Chief
digitized by the Space Studies Institute ssi.org
0191-9067/81/030201-O2SO2.00/0 Copyright ® 1981 SUNSAT Energy Council THE SPACE SHUTTLE — A NEW BEGINNING PETER E. GLASER Arthur D. Little, Inc. Acorn Park Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140 The space shuttle has successfully completed its maiden voyage and has closed a gap in our capability to sail the high seas of space. Now is the time to fix our sights beyond the difficulties which this ambitious project had to overcome — and overcome it did — onto visions of new enterprises which could result in greater achievements in space for the benefit of mankind. The space shuttle accomplishment places within our grasp the realization of plans for industrial uses of space, for converting solar energy in space for use on Earth, for further improving our ability to use satellites for communications, Earth observation, and weather prediction, for scientific studies, and for a stepping stone towards the use of limitless extraterrestrial resources. We now can plan with greater certainty an agenda for expanded uses of Earth orbits, build upon the achievements of the past, and be resolute in our determination that this historic space mission will be but the first of many which could remove the limits to growth which today circumscribe our Earth-bound civilization. There are no limits to the evolution and growth of the planet Earth’s civilization if we shed our preconceived notions about what is achievable in the future. Navigators crossed the oceans, aviators shrank global distances, and astronauts walked on the Moon. Evolution is a continuing process toward man’s perfection and technology is providing some of the tools. Today, many perceive the space shuttle as an opportunity to produce new materials in orbit and to utilize extraterrestrial energy and other resources in the solar system to improve the lives of all peoples throughout the world. By following through and utilizing the potential for expanded orbital operations with the space shuttle in subsequent missions, we have a unique opportunity to lead the way through the dangerous crisis represented by finite resources, destructive weapons, and unmet requirements. We can aspire to an ever-growing understanding of the universe around us and the place of man in it. Thus we can bequeath to generations as yet unborn the capacity to reach for the stars and to overcome the threats which appear to overwhelm us as we grapple with the exhaustion of resources, environmental degradation, and the deprivations experienced by the major portion of the global population. Utilizing the limitless resources of space, we no longer need to rely solely on resources which are under the political control of a few nations favored by geographical accident, and we must hope to see the day when men can beat their swords into plowshares and know war no more.
We may not reach the goal of utilizing extraterrestrial resources in our lifetime but each of our lives is part of eternity. We should be satisfied if future generations can say of us that we took the first step in man’s journey to space, which will continue as long as the stars beckon and our species endures.
0191 -9067/81 /030203-04$02.00/0 Copyright ® 1981 SUNSAT Energy Council LETTERS TO THE EDITOR To the Editor: Ruth and Westphal, in “Solar Power Satellites for Europe” (SSPR 1, 351, 1980), correctly point out that the area of the rectenna increased with longitude offset. Figure 3 also correctly indicates that the azimuth of the microwave beam, and consequently the major axis of the rectenna ellipse, varies with longitude offset, although this is not mentioned in the text. The second point may prove to be of greater importance than the first, in that the rectenna must be installed so as to take account of any planned offset; conversely, the rectenna installation, once completed, fixes the longitude of the satellite servicing it. Some early SPS work contemplated, at least implicitly, a degree of flexibility in satellite/rectenna pairing. To my knowledge, this flexibility has not been specifically denied in subsequent work. Rectennas are still generally visualized with a north-south orientation, although this is not the case in general. This will be of more concern in the United States than in Europe, since the variation of azimuth with longitude offset is greater at lower latitudes. The effects of azimuth variation are not entirely unfavorable. It is possible, if not probable, that a rectenna site that had been considered unacceptable because of limited north-south extent might be completely adequate if the rectenna axis could be rotated 40° or 50°. Such rotation can be accomplished by longitude offsets of 25° to 35°, while increasing the land area required by only 15% to 18%. Louis E. Livingston Head, Systems Analysis Office Program Development Office Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas 77058 The following table summarizing nongovernmental space activities was provided by Theo Pirard, Space Information Center, Route de la Croix Maga, 54, B-4860 Pepin- ster, Belgium. Editor
FREE ENTERPRISE AROUND THE EARTH: PRIVATE COMPANIES FOR COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS IN SPACE Arianespace (Evry, France) McDonnell Douglas Astronautics (Huntington Beach, California) Otrag (Munich, Germany) Space Services (Houston, Texas) American Satellite Corporation (Germantown, Maryland) American Telephone & Telegraph (New York City) COMSAT (Washington, DC)
COMSAT General (Washington, DC) GTE Satellite (Stamford. Connecticut) Hughes Communications (Los Angeles, California) RCA Americom (Piscataway, New Jersey) Satellite Business Systems (McLean, Virginia)
Southern Pacific Communications (San Francisco, California) Telesat Canada (Ottawa, Ontario) Western Union Space Communicat (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey) ASN (Spacelab) (Koln, Germany) MBB Space Division (Munich, Germany) British Aerospace Dynamics Group (Stevenage, England)
0191-9067/81 /030207-12$02.00/0 Copyright ® 1981 SUNSAT Energy Council PROJECTING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTION TO SPS M. J. STOIL and J. R. BROWNELL, JR. KAPPA Systems, Inc. 1501 Wilson Boulevard Arlington. Virginia 22209 Observations of bloc and national behavior in international forums on global resource and technology issues suggest that primary attention in the projection of international reaction to satellite power systems should be focused on the political dimension of such reactions. Specifically, attention should be focused on the perceptions of national interest invoked by the development and implementation of SPS. This argument is based on the following assumptions: • SPS differs from communications satellite technology in that SPS invokes exploitation of resources which may be considered part of the “common heritage of mankind.” Further, SPS impinges on the future relative economic and political power capabilities of sovereign states. • International reaction to developments affecting “common heritage” resources consists of the varied reactions of national governments and blocs rather than a single, rational, relatively coherent consensus reaction. • The primary concern of nearly all national governments is the pursuit of perceived national interest rather than abstract technological concerns or concerns of international equity unrelated to national goals. • The distribution of influence and power among international actors in the field of satellite technology will be more likely to determine international agreements affecting SPS than existing legal norms or treaties-in-force. The following discussion provides support for these assumptions, based on the experiences at the Third U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the recent World Administrative Radio Conferences (WARC), and addresses their implications for predicting international reaction to SPS. Specifically, these assumptions suggest that the optimum means for achieving international acceptance of SPS lies in demonstrating its advantages to the national interests of key members of the international community. In effect, the success of SPS abroad will depend on how the SPS concept is presented outside the U.S. The organizational characteristics of the ultimate agency to be responsible for the development and commercialization of solar power satellites acquire importance in terms of the contributions of the organizational characteristics to this “selling” process. An earlier version of this article was presented by the authors to the 1980 SPS Program Review and Symposium, Lincoln. Nebraska. The authors express their appreciation to Dr. Peter E. Glaser of Arthur D. Little, Inc., and Dr. Alan Daurio of PRC for their kind comments and suggestions.
SATELLITE POWER AS A COMMON HERITAGE ISSUE As noted by Christol (1), solar power satellites will depend on the exploitation of world natural resources. These resources include geostationary orbit assignment, radio frequency spectrum assignment, and solar radiation. Satellite power may also involve effects on three additional “global” resources: the exosphere environment, the near-Earth atmosphere, and the global climate. It is often stated that the use of these resources by SPS will be governed by the international legal principle of res communis: the “rules” developed during the 17th and 18th centuries governing the use of territory and resources not governed by the jurisdiction of specific nations. As noted in Table 1, the application of res communis to the global resources required by SPS would limit intervention in SPS R&D by international authorities. However, it is likely that some nations and scholars will claim that these resources constitute part of “the common heritage of mankind,” and that their use should be governed by the “common heritage” concept of international resource use. This “common heritage” concept consists of the evolving principles of international law governing the use of specific resources viewed as part of the perpetual common resource heritage of mankind and therefore not subject to being claimed by individual nations. As summarized in Table 1, the application of the “common heritage” concept, as defined by Third World scholars, to resources required for SPS development, would create significant potential barriers to implementation of SPS, including extensive intervention by international regulatory authorities (2). In general, Western scholars define “common heritage” resources as limited, nonrenewable, and necessary for the future well-being of the human species. Solar radiation, geostationary orbit assignments, and radio frequency spectrum assignments fail to meet these criteria. However, non-Western legal scholars and governments have been known to claim specific resources as part of the “common heritage” merely on the basis that the resources in question are used by all of mankind. In the case of SPS use of geostationary orbits and radio frequency spectrum assignments, potential “common heritage” arguments would be strengthened by the apparent operational limitations on the possible number of such assignments (3). It has not been conclusively demonstrated that the relatively small amount of energy spillover from an SPS microwave beam or the waste heat released from surface rectennas might have long-term impacts on the world climate. Even less is known about potential SPS impacts on the Van Allen belts and on the exosphere environment. Under these circumstances, the claim that satellite power systems deteriorate these “common heritage” resources is most likely to be related internationally to political considerations. For example, if the Soviet bloc wishes to prevent or delay development of SPS by the West, it is likely that the microwave exposure standards promulgated by the USSR would be invoked as a global standard for exposure to SPS-generated microwave radiation. On the other hand, if the Soviet bloc did not wish to prevent SPS development — or wished to develop SPS unilaterally — the application of such standards would probably not be introduced in international forums (4). Similar health, climatological, and exospheric impacts of SPS are most likely to be discussed under current circumstances in conjunction with politically or ideologically-motivated opposition to satellite power. The best response to such claims is therefore additional research on SPS impacts combined with serious consideration of the political/ideological basis for such claims. The position of the industrialized nations on “common heritage” issues is not well defined. U.S. representatives have stated that “common heritage” is an “impor-
RES COMMUNIS AND “COMMON HERITAGE" PRINCIPLES: SIGNIFICANT POINTS AT ISSUE. BASED ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. SCHOLARSHIP; THIRD WORLD AND MARXIST SCHOLARS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AGREE ON ALL OBSERVATIONS MADE IN THIS CHART tant” principle, but maintain that it does not mean very much in the absence of a consensus definition of the term among all nations. In the absence of such agreement, the U.S. argues that exploitation of “common heritage” resources should proceed as if the concept did not exist (5). Although the USSR and other industrial nations have sided with this position with respect to deep seabed mining — the area in which the “common heritage” principle was first invoked— it is entirely possible that they will not do so with respect to SPS. Thus, SPS could face considerable opposition, not encountered in the development of communications satellite technology, unless the “common heritage” issues are addressed. SPS AND FUTURE NATIONAL CAPABILITIES A second significant difference between satellite power and communications satellite technology is their relative impact on the long-range future economic and
political power capabilities of nation-states. The instantaneous communications capability provided by satellites is essentially a luxury, not essential to the national development of small nations (6). In fact, membership in a global “telecommunications village’’ through satellite technology is not desired by all nations: the minutes of the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference reveal that it represents a threat to entrenched ideologies and to traditional patterns of political communication. This is not true for satellite power technology. As fossil fuels are depleted, the comparative economic advantage accruing to nations receiving energy from SPS will be greatly enhanced. Eventually, it may be impossible to sustain a large-scale industrial society without access to satellite power or other “exotic” energy sources. Consequently, control over satellite power in the 21st century has potential for the same type of economic and political influence currently wielded by OPEC. Monopoly control over SPS by any single entity—an international organization, a multinational consortium (like INTELSAT), a national government or a private monopoly — could eventually be perceived as a significant threat to national development and to the maintenance of effective state sovereignty. In general, the nations which will tend to risk the most through monopolistic development of SPS will be among those which are today most vulnerable to OPEC activities: industrialized and industrializing societies which, for reasons of geography and lack of access to “exotic” technology, cannot depend on domestic resources for their potential energy needs. On the issue of military applications of SPS, there is an analogy between SPS and the development of communications satellite technology. It is doubtful that most military applications of either technology represent a significant threat to the longterm national interests of most nations, in comparison to the threat posed the political-economic implications of satellite power in a world of depleted fossil fuels. Quite simply, if a nation has the resources and the will to use satellites for military purposes, it does not need to develop SPS or civilian communications satellites as an elaborate “cover” for its military operations; the same purpose could be accomplished by launching orbital military installations under the guise of, e.g., orbital scientific laboratories (7). THE FORMAT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTION TO SPS National governments are the actors that will aggregate policy positions regarding SPS, express them in international negotiations, and attempt to influence the outcome of the development and implementation of SPS. Figure 1 illustrates the process through which international political reactions to technological and resource issues are formulated. As indicated, this is not merely a question of governments rationally developing a single, coherent policy. Instead, whenever the national decisionmaking process for a specific issue area is decentralized to some degree, national positions on the issue tend to be achieved only after arduous intragovernmental conflict and negotiation among competing domestic interests (8). Figure 1 also illustrates that modification of national positions on technological and resource issues may occur after conclusion of domestic negotiations, through interaction with foreign and transnational actors. The most obvious example of this process is the coordination of East European policy positions through the Commission on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) and other intrabloc institutions. Other examples of formal attempts at intrabloc coordination include the activities of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a
Fig. 1. Simplified model of governmental position-formation process. consultative group of Western industrial nations, and the Group of 77, a similar body of Third World nations. It is at this stage in the decision-making process that private transnational actors also have the greatest potential to affect reaction to global technology and resource issues. In 1979, for example, a well-organized bloc of 12 Latin American delegations to the World Administrative Radio Conference came into existence through the efforts of the Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ, the World Association for Christian Communications, the Public Interest Satellite Association, and the International Institute for Communications. These four nongovernmental organizations supplied the Latin American delegates with documentary material, provided them with an analysis of the developed countries’ positions, and organized a preconference symposium at which delegates achieved consensus on a united policy stance and a common strategy in opposition to proposals of the OECD delegations (9). In the final analysis, however, the existence of “blocs” of international response to technological and resource questions appear to be far less influential than the preferences of individual governments. Evan Luard writes, with reference to the expression of political demands in international technical agencies, “In each organization, for the most part, each national delegation goes its own way, largely independently, supporting those demands which it thinks its government approves, and opposing those it rejects, with little concept of a deliberate, co-operative political strategy. Political organization, insofar as it exists at all (in the so-called group system), has only the most marginal influence on the voting of each delegation: when delegations vote together it is primarily because they have common interests or views, and would thus anyway do, rather than because of group pressures. . .” (10) In this context, one is reminded of incidents at UNCLOS III, at OPEC meetings, and at the Havana Conference of 1979 when “Third World unity” dissolved under the pressure of conflicting demands by individual governments. These observations suggest that a truly international reaction to SPS, per se, will not exist in the near future. Instead, the principal format of “international” reaction will be the sum of the reactions of individual foreign governments, as influenced by domestic and transnational interest groups. In most cases, the reactions of individual governments will coincide with the reactions of other governments in the same
geographic or ideological bloc: e.g., the Group of 77, the Andean group, the Soviet bloc nations, the OECD states, etc. NATIONAL INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL REACTION TO SPS The process of formulating national policy positions, as outlined in Figure 1, does not lend itself to a rational, coherent development of policy determined by a single conception of national interest. Even when nations consciously attempt to follow a course dictated by “national interest,” the resulting positions may appear vague or contradictory. This is because “national interest” itself consists of a set of potentially competing interests. As a general rule, the larger and more complex the state, the more diverse and potentially conflicting are the components of its “national interest.” These observations notwithstanding, there exist a basic set of interests which virtually all nations hold, and which cannot be compromised or traded. These can be defined as the permanent, primary national interests. As suggested by Thomas W. Robinson, they include protection of the nation’s physical, political, and cultural (including ideological) identity, and survival against encroachment from outside forces (11). If satellite power systems were to threaten any of these interests (as suggested earlier), rapid and determined national response would be expected regardless of side benefits of SPS technology that might accrue to the nation. Robinson’s concept of national interests also comprises additional variable and secondary interests that have potential for shaping an individual government’s reaction to the development and implementation of SPS. These vary widely, depending on the country under consideration; Table 2 provides illustrative examples, using hypothetical Soviet perceptions of Soviet national interests (12). As shown in Table 2, the motivation of pursuing national interest is unlikely to result automatically in rejection or acceptance of international cooperation in SPS development and implementation. Determination of a specific government’s reaction to satellite power therefore depends on careful assessment of the component primary, secondary, permanent and variable national interests affected by SPS under alternative development and implementation scenarios. The prediction of alternative national reactions to SPS based on perceived national interests is facilitated by the fact that most nations exhibit relatively consistent patterns in perceiving and expressing their interests. Albania, to cite an extreme example, perceives the maintenance of an autarkial economy as a permanent, primary interest. Consequently, since Albania is not very interested in developing interdependent relationships, its participation in multilateral discussions of resource questions is usually limited to advancing ideological goals: i.e., in using such forums to denounce imperialism, Soviet and Chinese communism, Zionism, and neocolonialism (13). Similarly, the Soviet Union tends to strongly support the right of states to unilaterally exploit resources required for its own economic and military interests; at UNCLOS III, the USSR has consistently been aligned with the other advanced technology states, including the nations of Western Europe (14). However, when the resource of technology at issue is unimportant to Soviet economic and political interests, the USSR tends to support the claims of lesser developed countries against the Western industrialized states as a means of advancing its ideological prestige. Similar observations on predictable definition and pursuit of national inter-
SAMPLE DEFINITION OF "NATIONAL INTERESTS" RELATING TO SPS OF THE SOVIET UNION. EXAMPLES OF SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE PROVIDED FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY AND ARE NOT TO BE TAKEN AS AUTHORITATIVE ests on resource and technological questions can be made concerning a large number of other key countries and delegations in international negotiations. The ability to identify predictable patterns in identification and assertion of national interest should not give rise to overconfidence in relation to projecting international political response to SPS. Knowing that phenomena can be studied and predicted empirically is no substitute for actually undertaking the effort to perform such studies and make such predictions. Further, strict reliance on observations of national and bloc behavior in negotiations on such matters as deep seabed mining or development of communications satellite networks may be misleading if applied directly to SPS. Despite some analogies between these applications of technology, solar power satellite systems are certain to invoke perceptions of national interest different from those invoked with reference to other technological and resource issues. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO SPS In an ideal world, international reaction to satellite power systems would be based on universal moral principles codified in existing agreements, treaties-in-force, and global common law. In that utopia, the previous discussion would have little relevance: the reaction to various scenarios for the development of satellite power would be coherent, authoritative, and completely predictable. But such a utopia has not
been achieved, and there is some question as to whether it ever can be achieved. As Werner Levi observed, “Morality is related to behavior and (rational) behavior is end oriented. . .The usual sequence: defining the interest first, choosing the behavior to realize it second, examining both in the light of morality third (assuming that all three processes are deliberate) creates a tendency to give interests primacy over morality. This becomes truer the stronger the interest. And there are no more compelling social interests than those called national interests.” (15) So long as national interests are perceived as primary motivating factors, it can be expected that international legal norms as a form of institutionalized international morality will receive secondary attention in influencing government reactions to technological and resource issues. Indeed, for most political leaders, a willingness to sacrifice national interest to the dictates of international law represents an absence of morality in the eyes of his or her national supporters. Yet international law exists and, to some extent, governs national behavior. This paradox has been addressed by the suggestion of some legal scholars and political scientists that international law is best understood as a reflection of, rather than an influence on, the national interests of the dominant actors in international relations (16). In the 1970’s, the validity of this thesis has been evidenced on numerous occasions. At UNCLOS III, for example, delegates of the USSR warned that the Soviet Union would not view as valid any treaty which it had not ratified, and that it would not ratify any treaty that created a strong international authority governing the deep seabed resources (17). Within the past year, the U.S. Ambassador to UNCLOS III has made similar declarations (18), while the leader of the U.S. delegation to the World Administrative Radio Conference warned that his country might defy decisions by the Conference that ran counter to the U.S. positions (19). In effect, the representatives of the superpowers were claiming effective veto powers to the creation of international legislation that ran counter to their national interests. In all likelihood, the tradition that states with the capability of enforcing international agreements will be the states that determine the effective content of such agreements will dominate the development of international laws governing satellite power systems. Only a limited number of developed countries have such a capability with respect to orbital systems, and most of them have the potential of regarding the development of satellite power to be beneficial to their national interests. If this potential is realized, the resulting international legal agreements will tend to encourage, rather than inhibit, development of SPS. Thus, the most relevant question of international reaction to SPS remains: what will be the perceived national interests regarding SPS of the key actors in the international system? PREPARING FOR THE INEVITABLE DEBATE In August 1974, debate began at UNCLOS III in Caracas on the rules and regulations to be embodied in an international agreement on exploitation of deep seabed mineral resources. The U.S. and other developed countries shared similar positions; because private American firms were rapidly developing the technological capability to exploit such resources, the U.S. was very eager to have the issues resolved and was the first national delegation to present its case. The reaction of the lesser devel-
oped country delegations to the U.S. arguments was immediate and hostile. Edward Miles, a member of the U.S. delegation, reports on what happened next: “The EEC paper, presented by France, was very similar to the U.S. paper, but did not elicit the same response. The essential difference was one of style. Much of what the U.S. delegate said was in the form of ideological posturing about the free-enterprise system. There was an excessive amount of ‘noise’ in the communication, perhaps engendered by similar ideological posturing in the Group of 77. . .The point is that the ensuing barrage was aimed as much at the ‘noise’ as at substantive differences in approach, and this was clearly avoidable. The effects also appear to be lasting and, if so, will play a part in determining whether or not there is ultimate agreement.” (20) Since Miles wrote this description, UNCLOS III has moved toward acceptance of the position of the developed countries—primarily as a result of the efforts of EEC members such as France and Netherlands. The delay, however, has been costly, both in terms of U.S. prestige and in terms of delays in the development of deep seabed mining technology. If international acceptance of SPS is to be achieved, a similar contretemps on the issues of development and commercialization of satellite power should be avoided. The prospects for international acceptance of SPS are potentially good, since satellite power represents the harnessing of advanced technology to the solution of a problem that affects all of mankind: the eventual exhaustion of fossil fuels. At the same time, a potential for effective international opposition to SPS remains. The determining factor is the extent to which SPS proponents, including both scien- tific/technical personnel and others with influence over public policy, can present satellite power in a manner that emphasizes its beneficial effects of perceived national interests. . .and particularly the perceived national interests of countries with spacefaring capabilities. Specifically, the United States, which has taken the lead in research and development of SPS, must identify foreign interests that • are favorable to SPS development and commercialization; and • are complementary to U.S. national interests. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this concept of complementary national interests. For example, as stated earlier, all developed countries, including the Soviet Union, apparently share several similar perceptions of national interest in regard to points at issue in the development and exploitation of global resources. These shared perceptions may include a preference for weak international regulatory authorities, the maintenance of national and/or regional control over technology transfer, and defense of the right of the developer of global resources to distribute the benefits of exploitation with little or not mandatory sharing among the Third World. The EEC and CMEA nations appear to share similar perceptions of national interest not held by other developed nations, notably a preference for development and exploitation of energy resources on a regional basis by public enterprises. Finally, the Soviet bloc and the Group of 77 share an ideological interest in depicting private development of global resources in the worst possible light: as selfish exploitation by unsavory capitalists and neocolonialists. Some general principles on the projection of international reaction to SPS are readily derived from these observations. Emphasis on ideological arguments in favor of either the SPS concept or specific aspects of its development and commercialization are likely to be counterproductive. Emphasis on SPS capabilities for decreasing the demand for fossil fuels are likely to be more useful in promoting favorable
reactions to SPS since the long-term interest of virtually every nation favors lessened demand for fossil fuels. At the same time, emphasis on the potential for SPS to decrease the cost of fossil fuels is not likely to be as well received; domestic petroleum and coal producers in the developed nations, and OPEC members internationally, have a specific interest in maintaining relatively high fossil fuel prices. Most importantly, regardless of whether SPS is developed and commercialized on a national or multinational basis, the projection of international political reaction to solar power satellite system research and development depends on a thorough understanding of how SPS will potentially affect the perceived national interests of those states most directly concerned with satellite technology and advanced energy technology. This means that existing research on international legal aspects of SPS must be supplemented by additional studies of the perceived national interests of such countries as the USSR, France, China, India, Japan, and politically influential members of the Group of 77, relative to solar power satellites. In 1975, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed that “Technology has driven us into vast new areas of human activity and opened up prospects of either
human progress or international contention. The use of the oceans and of outer space. . .will surely become areas of growing dispute if they are not regulated by a legal order.” He added, “Our basic foregin policy objective inevitably must be to shape a stable and cooperative global order out of diverse and contending interests. But this is not enough. Preoccupation with interests and power is at best sterile and at worst an invitation to a constant test of strength. The true task of statemanship is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition.” (21) In this respect, the preoccupation with the question of perceived national interests relative to SPS should not be confused with a preoccupation with interests for their own sake. Rather, it is a recognition that identifying and addressing complementary national interests are only first steps in creating an international political climate conducive to using the SPS concept as a response to challenges facing all of mankind.
REFERENCES 1. C.Q. Christol, Satellite Power Systems (SPS) International Agreements, p. 73, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Research, Washington, DC, 1978. 2. A detailed definition of the “common heritage" concept in its original application is found in the address of Ambassador Arvid Pardo to the U.N. General Assembly, UN Doc. A/6695 XXII, 1967. 3. See, for example, W.R. Hinchman, Issues in Spectrum Resource Management, in W.R. Hinchman, ed., The Future of Satellite Communications: Resource Management and the Needs of Nations, esp. pp. 52-53, The 20th Century Fund, New York, 1970. An extreme example of unscientific claims of violation of the “common heritage" principle is the recent charges by the Republic of Mexico that the U.S. Government is diverting tropical storms from their normal courses, thus depriving northwest Mexico of needed rainfall. 4. For example, according to L.P. David of PRC, Inc., the Soviet Union does not demand compliance with its own microwave radiation exposure standards domestically when its economic interests are involved, as in the construction and operation of long-distance electric transmission lines. 5. J.N. Moore, in F.T. Christy, ed., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond, p. 36, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1975. 6. It is, however, vital to geographically-dispersed countries such as Indonesia, and to countries engaged in frequent coordination of large-scale military and diplomatic activities on a global basis, such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 7. The USSR, for example, has consciously chosen to designate both scientific and military satellites as Salyut missions, with the same basic design configuration used for both types of vehicles. Note Aviat. Week Space Technol. 109, 17, 1978. 8. A.L. Hollick and R.E. Osgood, New Era of Ocean Politics, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1974; J. P. Lester, Domestic Structures and Foreign Policy, presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Los Angeles, March 19-21, 1980. 9. L. Brown, U.S. Radio Expansion Thwarted at World Parley, New York Times, 22 November 1979, p. C22. 10. D.E.T. Luard, International Agencies: The Emerging Framework of Interdependence, p. 317, Macmillan, London, 1977. 11. T.W. Robinson, National Interests, in J.N. Rosenar, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (Rev. ed.), p. 184, The Free Press, New York, 1969. 12. Table 2 is based on, but not identical to, a table provided by Robinson (Ref. 11). 13. See any of the Albanian delegation’s statements at UNCLOS Ill for examples of this extreme rhetorical approach to multilateral resource and technology negotiations. In voting behavior, Albania tends to be aligned with the Group of 77. 14. See, for example, B. Buzan, Seabed Politics, p. 227, Praeger, New York, 1976; E. Miles, in F.T. Christy, ed., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1975. 15. W. Levi, In J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (Rev. ed.), pp. 194-195, The Free Press, New York, 1969. 16. See Ref. 15. See also M.A. Kaplan and N. DeB. Katzenbach, International Law, World Order, and Human Progress, Am. Political Sci. Rev. 53, 693-712, 1959. 17. E. Miles, in F.T. Christy, ed.. Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond, p. 67, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA, 1975. 18. E.L. Richardson, Law of the Sea: A Test for the United Nations, address to the Washington Press Club, Washington, DC, March 14, 1979. 19. As quoted in the New York Times, 4 December 1979, p. D4. 20. See Ref. 17, p. 65. 21. H.A. Kissinger, International Law, World Order, and Human Progress, address to the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association, Montreal, August 11, 1975.
0191-9067/81/030219-06S02.00/0 Copyright ® 1981 SUNS AT Energy Council SOLAR POWER SATELLITES: RESULTS OF A PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAM KEN BOSSONG Citizen’s Energy Project 1110 6th Street, NW 300 Washington, DC 20001 Between January 1979 and October 1980, the Citizen’s Energy Project coordinated a segment of an experimental public outreach program on the proposed Solar Power Satellite (SPS) for the U.S. Department of Energy and the PRC Energy Analysis Company. The goals of the outreach program included sampling attitudes towards the SPS among members of CEP's constituency — mainly solar, environmental, and antinuclear organizations as well as local and state government officials, labor groups, individual “appropriate technology” activists, and some members of academia. The outreach program was also designed to pinpoint unanswered questions and issues of special concern to this constituency at a point early in the SPS’s development to facilitate consideration of these issues and possibly their resolution; and the outreach program was intended to experiment with a number of approaches for encouraging public participation in the review of a major technology while it was still in the most preliminary planning stages. The Citizens’ Energy Project (CEP) is a nonprofit, tax-exempt research and advocacy organization working on a number of prosolar, antinuclear, and communitylevel technology development issues; over the past seven years, it has issued approximately 150 books and reports as well as several newsletters on these topics. The SPS was one of the issues which CEP has previously considered in several of its publications and, as a result, the Department of Energy, in late 1978, invited CEP to coordinate a part of DOE’s “public outreach experiment/program” on the SPS. The DOE also contracted the L-5 Society and the Forum for the Advancement of Students in Science and Technology to also participate in the outreach program. It was generally understood by DOE and PRC from the beginning of the outreach program that CEP was a critic of the SPS concept while the L-5 Society was an advocate and FASST was more or less neutral. As the first step in the outreach effort, each of the three organizations was asked to develop accurate summaries of approximately 20 SPS “white papers” that had been earlier issued by the DOE on a range of issues and questions prompted by the technology. These included military implications, environmental impacts, economics, social concerns, and international aspects. Each of the three groups was asked to emphasize in their respective summaries those points and issues thought to be of special interest to their respective constituencies. At no time were these summaries edited by DOE or PRC or anyone other than those deemed appropriate by each group, respectively.
Each organization subsequently distributed their summaries to 3000 of their members or organizational contacts. FASST prepared individual summaries of each of the SPS “white papers” and then mailed them in a single mailing to their list. The L-5 Society issued their summaries as a single, condensed report. And CEP, like FASST, prepared individual summaries corresponding to the individual white papers; however, CEP mailed its 22 summaries out in five separate packets distributed over a five-month period. All three organizations sent cover letters with their respective mailings informing constituents of the outreach effort and requesting their participation. Each organization also sent along questionnaires and other response forms to encourage comment. Feedback requested by the L-5 Society addressed critical issues involved in the implementation of the SPS whereas CEP addressed critical issues involved in the concept of the SPS; FASST requested no structured feedback on the SPS concept and solicited only general comments or questions. The L-5 Society asked such questions as who should research, construct, and own the SPS; what areas of research needed more emphasis; what reference design alternatives should be given more emphasis; and what government agencies should play a role in SPS development. The Citizens’ Energy Project asked opinions about the economics, the environmental issues, the social concerns, the impact of centralization, health and safety issues, and preferable alternatives; CEP also solicited comments on the objectivity of the white paper summaries. FASST asked its constituents to rate the summaries as a means of both informing and involving students in the SPS concept development process. In response to these mailings, CEP eventually received 382 written comments; CEP also conducted 30 telephone interviews with key constituent group members to elicit more detailed comments. Of these CEP respondents, 6% expressed support for the SPS concept. About 9% were effectively neutral on the issue; generally they indicated that further study of the option was warranted. Finally, about 85% of CEP’s respondents expressed varying degrees of opposition to the SPS concept. While the outreach program could not be considered a scientific survey or a statistically accurate poll, the results are valuable as indicators of issues felt to be important by the environment/solar energy citizen groups community. The issues most frequently cited as the basis for opposition were [1] high economic costs, [2] environ- mental/health threats posed by the use of microwaves; [3] miscellaneous environmental issues such as land use, air pollution, and materials use; [4] the adverse military consequences of an SPS program; and [5] a preference for small-scale, decentralized solar technologies. Amost 70% of CEP’s respondents felt that the SPS was too expensive and would result in excessive capital concentration in the hands of a few large businesses. Fully half of the respondents cited the opportunity costs of the SPS — notably that it threatened to take funds away from other energy options especially decentralized solar energy technologies and energy conservation. Nearly 35% of the respondents considered SPS economics to be the most significant obstacle confronting SPS development while one-third of the comments questions who would control the SPS and reap the financial benefits of its development. One person quoted from former U.S. Senator James Abourezk’s statement on the SPS; when being lobbied for his support on the original $15.6 million feasibility assessment for the SPS, Abourezk reportedly stated: “These types of energy projects seem to have two stages—too early to tell and too late to do anything about it.” About 92% of the respondents cited microwaves as being a major source of con-
cem; approximately half of the respondents suggested that further study of this specific issue was warranted. Many of the respondents considered microwaves to be the major “environmental” problem associated with the SPS. Several respondents were concerned about related potential microwave problems such as “interference with electronic communications.” A New Mexico couple drew inferences about possible health impacts of microwaves from the report that “. . .microwave beams used as spy devices (e.g, those aimed at the American Embassy in Moscow) were shown to have caused leukemia among Embassy staff and families.” While most respondents cited other environmental problems they saw with the SPS, there was a great deal of diversity in what people perceived as being the most significant of these impacts. Numerous themes or subissues surfaced as the responses were reviewed by CEP. Land use, environmental impact statements, the “greenhouse effect,” rocket exhaust, depletion of scarce minerals and natural resources, conventional terrestrial construction and requisite mining practices were among topics receiving comments. Almost 13% of the comments specifically noted problems of land use and land degradation including not only rectenna siting but also the stringing of high-voltage transmission lines. If there was a common thread among the environmental responses, it was stated most succinctly by one respondent: “The environmental impacts alone should turn the government away from this concept.” Of those responding to the questions regarding health and safety issues, several respondents (who identified themselves as scientists) were dubious about the technical feasibility of keeping men and women in outer space for long durations without impairing their health. Several comments were also received from individuals who stated that personal safety factors would adversely affect space workers, thus severely inhibiting the construction schedule. Approximately 30% of the respondents saw the SPS as a dangerous trend towards centralization of energy planning, big government, and concentration of capital in a small number of big businesses. A major concern of those addressing this issue was that the SPS and other centralized energy systems are “capital drains” that pull financial resources “away from decentralized, more benign energy systems.” For example, a Division Chief of Montana’s Department of Natural Resources and Conservation wrote: “More electricity produced in a centralized facility is not the answer to today’s or tomorrow’s energy crisis. This $76 billion (estimated cost for an orbiting SPS prototype) could produce much more positive results for our society if put into decentralized, dispersed, renewable energy technologies and conservation;” and several people concurred with the feelings of one respondent who described the SPS as a “potential danger to our visions for a democratic future America.” Almost 60% of CEP’s respondents noted the military implications of the SPS concept suggesting that the SPS could be used as a military weapon, could be a military target, or could encourage a whole new round of weapons development. A large majority of the comments highlighted two primary concerns: [1] “. . .by merely redirecting the beam, the SPS could become an instrument of war,” and [2] “The SPS is a sitting duck for enemy action.” “SPS. . .has military implications which contradict our basic policy of peace through disarmament,” wrote a representative of a major national religious organization. Readers of the summaries who commented on the international considerations important to the discussion of the SPS, voiced a wide variety of concerns related to this topic. One reviewer summarized the feelings of 40% of those individuals responding to this issue by stating: “Internationalizing the SPS will prove difficult at best; other countries would be paranoid about who would control it and those coun-
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