be developed on a truly collaborative basis, then strong forces will have to come into play to override the “normal” tendency of nations to attempt to preserve their technological and economic advantages. There are a number of such forces which can be identified. One is the realization that the financial and/or technological dimensions of SPS are in fact so great that the undertaking is only feasible through collaboration among several capable states. Another is a consensus that going the SPS route is a necessary or preferred way for the West to counter the threat to its security and economic well-being represented by OPEC control of petroleum resources. A third is some conceivable set of political bargains which links European or Japanese access to a SPS program to other political or economic interests vital to the United States. The competition among the industrial states for shares in world leadership is likely to be one of the -continuing features of the global political scene in the next two to three decades. If SPS approaches reality in that period, it cannot but be linked to that set of competitive relationships. Too often, discussions of the future development of the SPS program ignore this reality, and focus on what seem to me quite unrealistic analyses of the ideal international management structure for the program. Such analyses, without attention to the political interests involved and to the likely influence of those interests on the behavior of major actors, seem to me not very useful. SPS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Many of the global trends identified above call attention to the increasing use of multilateral fora to deal with issues that formerly could be settled on a bilateral basis. I think it is useful to perceive the world as in the process of international organization; this involves not the creation of static institutions called international organizations, but rather the dynamic process of agreeing on a set of rules and patterns of accepted behavior through which various specific activities with global dimensions can proceed. Whatever its undesirable attributes, the United Nations system has provided a very useful setting for the negotiations leading to agreed upon regimes for particular global activities such as space exploration and, hopefully, ocean exploitation. If SPS comes into being, it is almost certain that the U.N. will be engaged in creating such a regime for its operation. The unavoidable “danger” of using the U.N. system for this purpose is that states with little real stake in developments such as SPS will attempt to exercise influence over the outcome of these negotiations, based on their own set of political interests. Major countries would much prefer to negotiate agreements outside of the U.N. framework, but the dynamics of international relationships in the late 20th century and the need for some general forum where issues of global dimension can be discussed drive those countries to the use of the U.N., more or less against their better judgment. A country or group of countries could undertake independent development of a SPS system and put it into operation over the objections of others. However, this path seems unlikely, given the general desire for international stability and the emerging tradition of negotiating agreed-upon rules of behavior at the time major new technological capabilities are deployed. All this suggests that international organizations, and the political forces which operate within them, will be actively engaged with the SPS issue in the coming decades. Again, it is naive to expect that these discussions can be kept on the
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