capabilities, many decisions with respect to deployment of those capabilities cannot escape being discussed in a multilateral context, and national freedom of action is being increasingly constrained by some concept of international “accountability,” especially when that deployment involves the use of the “international commons.” e. Equally, issues which have always been the province of government are being melded with those which traditionally have been left to private interests for decision. Increasingly, and particularly with the rising influence of large, transnational enterprises, the line between “public” and “private” is very blurred, and there is a rising trend for international public regulation of what nominally are private transnational activities. f. Finally, there is a tendency towards increasing the number of participants in multilateral bargaining, with all of those able to claim a legitimate stake in the outcome of a particular bargain being allowed to have some voice in setting at least the general principles which will determine that outcome. More and more, international decisions on issues of resource management and wealth distribution, among others, are being made by the messy, noisy, not always rational process of open debate among those with often widely divergent interests and ideologies. The development of a SPS system will take place in an international context defined by these global trends and will be debated at the center, not at the periphery, of political attention. The following paragraphs attempt to identify a few of the specific implications of those trends for the politics of SPS. SPS: COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION? The key role with respect to SPS development will continue to be played by Western industrial states operating within this messy global context.* While other nation-states may perceive a high stake in SPS development, and will bring their concerns to various multilateral fora, it is unlikely that they will be able to exert much real influence over SPS development, given the limited resources that they have as a basis for such influence. While developing countries may argue about various aspects of SPS development, particularly in those organs of the U.N. system which provide a forum for such protests, and while the views of developing countries are likely to be taken into consideration by SPS planners, the effective locus of political and economic power in this area of energy and space technology will remain with the industrial states. It is naive to think that those states will automatically see their interest to lie in close collaboration in developing a SPS system. Both because SPS development and operation would serve as a driving force in many areas of high technology, and because an operating SPS system would have significant economic and national security implications, countries which might consider SPS development (and in the current context, this likely means only the United States) will only invite others into the enterprise if there is no real alternative. If the solar power satellite concept is to *This paper ignores the possibility of early development of the SPS concept by the Soviet Union. This is probably an indefensible omission; it is made to simplify an already complex discussion. Clearly, Soviet involvement in SPS development would add yet another confounding dimension to the problems discussed in this paper.
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